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Note
Turner v. Rogers, the Right to Counsel, and the
Deficiencies of Mathews v. Eldridge
Tom Pryor*
The three year stretch from 2005 through 2008 was a
rough one for Michael Turner. He struggled with unemployment, substance abuse, and spent almost half that time in pris1
on. But while Turner’s story sounds depressingly unremarkable, two details may come as a surprise to most Americans:
Turner was not sentenced to prison because of a criminal conviction, and he was not represented by an attorney prior to be2
ing sentenced. Instead, Turner was convicted of civil contempt
3
of court for failure to pay arrears on child support. Turner did
not need an attorney because, in theory, his imprisonment was
conditioned on his willful noncompliance with the court order to
4
make child support payments. Turner supposedly held “the
5
keys to his cell.” Unfortunately, the court did not determine
whether Turner actually had the ability to pay his debt, which
he did not, leaving him helplessly imprisoned for the duration
6
of his sentence. Turner eventually secured pro bono counsel
* JD Candidate 2013, University of Minnesota Law School; Political
Science graduate student, University of Minnesota. I would like to thank
Sanjiv Laud, Jay Creagh and the Note and Comment Department of
the Minnesota Law Review for their invaluable advice and assistance. I am
also thankful for the tireless efforts of Paul Shneider and the staff members of
Volume 97. I am grateful to President E. Tom Sullivan for his guidance and
for inspiring me to write about this topic. Finally, I would like to thank Catherine Courcy for her support, her intelligent feedback, and her keen editorial
eye. The credit for whatever merit this Note contains belongs to those individuals. Any errors remain mine. Copyright © 2013 by Tom Pryor.
1. Brief for Petitioner at 8–15, Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011)
(No. 10-10), 2011 WL 49898 at *8–15. Turner served a six month stretch in jail
starting in 2005 and then a twelve month stretch in 2008. Id. at 10, 12.
2. Id. at 8–15.
3. Id.
4. See Price v. Turner, 691 S.E.2d 470, 472 (S.C. 2010).
5. Id.
6. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 2–3, 12.
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and appealed his sentence, arguing that imprisoning someone
for debts that he cannot pay amounts to criminal punishment
and that, in this light, he had a constitutional right to an attor7
ney in his contempt hearings.
8
The subsequent Supreme Court case, Turner v. Rogers,
raised an important and lingering question about what process
is due prior to depriving someone of his liberty via a civil contempt hearing. In procedural due process cases like Turner, the
Court typically balances the interests of the individual against
society’s interests in order to determine whether the costs of
additional procedural protections are worth the decreased risk
9
of an erroneous deprivation of rights. The resulting procedural
requirements vary depending on the nature of the interest and
10
especially the context of the hearing. For example, minors
11
must receive counsel in juvenile detention hearings but there
is no constitutional requirement that attorneys participate in
12
probation revocation hearings, even though the minor and the
probationer are both at risk of imprisonment. Ever since the
Court recognized a Sixth Amendment right for an attorney in
13
criminal cases in Gideon v. Wainwright, it has expanded procedural protections—including rights to an attorney—in con14
texts outside the realm of traditional criminal trials. Calls for
a “Civil Gideon” that would secure a right to an attorney in all
civil cases seemed to be making headway before the Supreme
15
Court ruled on Michael Turner’s case. In Turner v. Rogers, the
7. See id. at 12–13, 40–41.
8. 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011).
9. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (establishing three
factors to be balanced in determining the constitutionally mandated procedures in a deprivation hearing).
10. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & TONI M. MASSARO, THE ARC OF DUE PROCESS
IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 197–
98) (on file with author) (demonstrating that the extent to which the Court defers to Congress’s procedural framework is based more upon the context in
which a protected interest was divested than on the type of interest).
11. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 34–42 (1967).
12. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 783–91 (1973).
13. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
14. For an excellent source on procedural due process cases, see generally
RHONDA WASSERMAN, PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2004).
15. See, e.g., Simran Bindra & Pedram Ben-Cohen, Public Civil Defenders:
A Right to Counsel for Indigent Civil Defendants, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &
POL’Y 1 (2003); Robert W. Sweet, Civil Gideon and Confidence in a Just Society, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 503 (1998); Sarah Dina Moore Alba, Comment,
Searching for the “Civil Gideon”: Procedural Due Process and the Juvenile
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divided Court was unanimous on one point: the Due Process
Clause does not “automatically” require representation by
counsel in a civil contempt hearing, even if the individual is
16
subsequently imprisoned.
This Note argues that the Supreme Court’s analysis, as exemplified by Turner, strays from the original purpose of the
Due Process Clause. The Note goes on to outline ways to secure
representation for individuals like Michael Turner despite the
Court’s ruling. It does not argue that Turner was wrongly decided under current law, but that the framework used in the
decision is inappropriate for due process cases. The proposed
solution thus focuses on expanding protections of disadvantaged litigants while simultaneously moving the Court’s procedural due process jurisprudence towards a more appropriate
framework. Part I explores the history and application of the
Due Process Clause to procedural matters, particularly the
right to counsel. Part II discusses the Turner v. Rogers case and
explains how the factual and legal context of civil contempt
proceedings could easily have produced a constitutional finding
of a right to counsel under the Due Process Clause. Part II also
explains how the Court’s procedural due process jurisprudence
made it possible to rule otherwise in the Turner case and why
that indicates a larger problem with the Court’s approach to
procedural due process cases. Part III argues for an alternative
approach to procedural due process modeled on the Court’s
substantive due process cases and explains why it would be
more appropriate for determining whether litigants have a constitutional right to counsel in civil contempt hearings that risk
incarceration. To achieve that end or its equivalent, this Note
suggests taking legislative and litigation-based steps. Because
the Court’s current procedural due process jurisprudence gives
it wide latitude to pursue outcomes like the one in Turner, legislation and very careful litigation efforts may be the best and
only means of securing counsel in civil contempt hearings in
the short-term and a change to the Court’s procedural due process analysis in the long-term.

Right to Counsel in Termination Proceedings, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1079
(2011).
16. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011). The four dissenting Justices agreed that there was no due process right to counsel in a civil
contempt hearing but disagreed that the petitioner was due the enhanced protections provided for by the majority. Id. at 2521 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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I. BACKGROUND
Procedural due process jurisprudence has a venerable ped17
igree but sometimes receives less than it is “due” in legal aca18
demia. The rules that determine whether a litigant receives a
hearing or an attorney prior to being deprived of a right are of
obvious importance to anyone involved in a judicial hearing.
This Part briefly outlines the original purpose of the Due Process Clause, some of its basic applications and frameworks, and
the role that it has come to play in modern American case law.
In particular, it explores why and in what way the Court’s jurisprudence can appear inconsistent, particularly with regards
to the right to counsel, and establishes the practical importance
of an otherwise academic debate.
A. ORIGINS OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
The Due Process Clause derives from text in the Magna
Carta that prohibited the government from depriving people of
19
their rights except by the “law of the land.” Commentators
disagree over the original English understanding of the
20
clause, but there is good evidence that American colonists un17. See, e.g., Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59
U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
18. The entire discussion of Procedural Due Process takes up five of the
1395 pages in one textbook on constitutional law. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN &
GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 495–99 (17th ed. 2010). Further, a
Westlaw search as of February 7, 2013, for law review articles that have “procedural due process” in the title produces 153 documents; the same search for
articles that have “substantive due process” in the title produces 234 documents, and a search for articles that have “free speech” or “first amendment”
produce 1244 and 3744 articles, respectively.
19. See Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 276; Frederick Mark Gedicks, An
Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law
Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585, 596–97
(2009) (“It is universally agreed that the concept of ‘due process of law’ is rooted in Magna Carta, or the ‘Great Charter’. . . . Without doubt the most influential provision of Magna Carta has been the ‘law of the land’ clause of Chapter
29: ‘No free man shall be arrested or imprisoned, or disseised or outlawed or
exiled or in any way victimized, neither will we attack him or send anyone to
attack him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the
land.’” (quoting Magna Carta (1215 & 1225), reprinted in RALPH V. TURNER,
MAGNA CARTA THROUGH THE AGES 226, 231 (2003)); see also E. Thomas Sullivan & Toni M. Massaro, Due Process Exceptionalism, 46 IRISH JURIST 117,
123–29 (2011).
20. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT.
REV. 85, 95–96 (arguing that the “law of the land” simply meant that the
monarch and the courts were bound by whatever laws and processes were
passed by Parliament).
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derstood the phrase to pronounce a judicial check on arbitrary
government power and a promise that a “higher law” protected
21
their natural rights. Early cases confirmed this interpretation. In one of the first cases to deal with the application of the
Due Process Clause, the Court ruled that legislative acts did
not define the “law of the land” but instead were constrained by
22
the requirement of “due process of law.” Eventually, the Court
began to distinguish between laws that ran afoul of the Due
Process Clause by abrogating fundamental rights and those
23
that simply deprived rights without adequate procedures. The
former line of cases became known as “substantive due process”
cases whereas the latter were deemed “procedural due process”
cases. Although their doctrines and place in the law have diverged sharply since the nineteenth century, both maintain
their pedigree by operating as checks against arbitrary or erro24
neous rights deprivations.
The history and evolution of procedural due process jurisprudence demonstrate the original purpose of the Due Process
Clause and also an underlying tension regarding how active the
Court should be in applying it. For example, the Court at one
point distinguished between “rights” and “privileges” and allowed the government to create whatever procedures it wanted
for depriving interests that fell within the “privilege” catego25
ry. Because public employees had no “right” to their jobs un21. See id. at 96–97; Gedicks, supra note 19, at 611–21.
22. See Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 276–77 (noting that the Due Process
Clause constrains executive and legislative power and that due process is defined by the provisions of the Constitution as well as the “settled usages” of
English common and statutory law prior to colonization).
23. The Supreme Court appears to have first used the term “substantive
due process” in Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 90 (1948)
(Rutledge, J., dissenting). “Procedural due process” was first used in Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 137 (1934) (Roberts, J., dissenting). The Snyder
Court also drew a distinction between the use of due process to protect “substantial” rights and due process rules that govern the procedures of the courts.
Id.
24. See, e.g., Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive
Due Process, Procedural Due Process, and the Bill of Rights, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 833, 841 (2003) (“Ultimately, the substantive due process clause is a
‘bulwark [] . . . against arbitrary’ government action. But action can be arbitrary in more than one sense—and the Due Process Clause has been construed
to provide protection against more than one type of arbitrary government action.” (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532 (1884)); see also id. at
847–48 (describing the similarities and differences of substantive and procedural due process).
25. See William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1439–42 (1968).
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der this standard, for example, they could be dismissed with
26
little to no procedural protections. The Court eventually rejected the rights/privileges framework on the grounds that such
a “wooden” distinction could not adequately account for the
magnitude of the interest nor could it adequately adapt to
27
evolving concepts of “liberty” and “property.”
Later, a faction on the Court attempted to establish a similar line of jurisprudence wherein a statute creating an interest
could also define that interest by establishing the procedures
28
by which it could be divested. Someone who receives a government benefit, for example, must take the “bitter with the
sweet” and submit to the statutorily established procedures for
29
terminating that benefit. The Court officially rejected the
short-lived “bitter with the sweet” analysis, however, because
allowing the legislature to define an interest by its procedures
would be a “tautology” and would render the constitutional
30
guarantee of due process meaningless. Throughout these
twists and turns of procedural due process jurisprudence, the
Court thus has continually reestablished its role as an independent check on the government. In so doing, it reinforced the
idea that the “law of the land” or “due process of law” is not
merely the positive law as defined by Congress but includes
more fundamental notions of justice and fairness and, importantly, a check against arbitrary or capricious government
actions.
Substantive due process has played a similar if more
(in)famous role in advancing the Due Process Clause’s original
purpose. Some have claimed that substantive due process has
26. See id. at 1439 (citing McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517
(Mass. 1892)).
27. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571–72 (1972).
28. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153–54 (1974) (plurality opinion)
(ruling that “where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined
with the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in determining that right, a litigant in the position of appellee must take the bitter with
the sweet”); see also Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 355–61 (1976) (White, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the majority opinion in Bishop implicitly upholds the
principles of the Arnett plurality, principles that had been rejected by six
members of the Arnett Court); Buhr v. Buffalo Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 38, 509 F.2d
1196, 1200 (8th Cir. 1975) (citing Arnett as authority for the claim that a statute that defines a property or liberty interest in public employment can also
define the procedures by which it is divested).
29. Arnett, 416 U.S. at 153–54.
30. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 540–43 (1985)
(noting that the “bitter with the sweet” analysis was established by a threevote plurality and was opposed by the other six justices in Arnett).
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been used to invalidate more federal statutes than any other
31
constitutional provision. A full history of substantive due process is beyond the scope of this Note, but a brief exploration of
its “fundamental rights” analysis will suffice to demonstrate
why the doctrine has been such a potent component of the Due
Process Clause. The Court has often ruled that the liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause include certain
fundamental rights which may not be abrogated absent a com32
pelling government interest. The exact formulation of the rule
33
for whether a right can be considered “fundamental” varies,
but the general question is whether the right is essential to our
34
American system of ordered liberty. Using this formulation,
the Court has determined that almost all of the rights protected
in the Bill of Rights are “fundamental” and hence incorporated
against the states via the 14th Amendment’s Due Process
35
Clause. The Court has also found that certain unemunerated
rights, like the right to privacy, are fundamental and hence de36
serve substantive due process protection.
The government is generally prohibited from infringing
37
upon a fundamental right, regardless of the process used. The
Court is willing to make exceptions to that general prohibition
but only after using heightened scrutiny to assess the law: the
law will be upheld only if the “infringement is narrowly tailored
38
to serve a compelling state interest.” This two-part process
neatly encapsulates the Due Process Clause’s underlying purpose of checking against arbitrary government action for two
reasons. First, it establishes whether a right is fundamental
even if the right is not strictly established by positive law. Second, it places a heavy burden upon the government to prove
that the right must be abridged, thus providing a judicial check
against arbitrary government action.
31. See Rubin, supra note 24, at 835.
32. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965); see also
Rubin, supra note 24, at 841–42.
33. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3031–34 (2010); Rubin, supra note 24, at 841–42.
34. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3034 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 149, 149 n.14 (1968)).
35. See id. at 3034–35.
36. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719–20 (1997) (citing cases in which the Court extended substantive due process protections to
rights not explicitly enumerated in the Constitution, including the right to
marry, to have children, and to use contraception).
37. See id. at 721.
38. Id. (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
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B. CURRENT PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE
Currently, when the Court determines that a state action
39
threatens an interest protected by the Due Process Clause,
there is a dizzying array of procedural due process rules, precedents, and frameworks that the Court can use to reach a decision. As a result, there has been a proliferation of procedural
due process rights over the past half century. In criminal cases,
for example, the Court has established various “free-standing”
due process rights that supplement protections explicitly estab40
lished by the Bill of Rights. The Court revolutionized the juvenile justice system by requiring, on procedural due process
grounds, that minors receive similar procedural protections as
41
their adult counterparts. And the Court has required pretermination hearings for welfare recipients at risk of losing
42
their benefits, informal hearings for convicts at risk of losing
43
their good-time credits, and minimal standards for notice and
44
hearings for suspended public school students, to name a few.
In such cases, the Court has expanded procedural due process rights not by simply building on precedent but by applying
context-sensitive frameworks that are capable of producing
45
outcomes in tension with holdings of similar cases. These
frameworks demonstrate varying degrees of deference for the
procedural balance struck by the government. For example, in
the military context the court asks “whether the factors militat39. The Court has determined that a slew of interests, such as a property
interest in continued employment or a liberty interest in one’s reputation, are
protected by the Due Process Clause. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,
599–603 (1972) (noting that an implicit guarantee of continued employment
can create a protected interest for Due Process Clause purposes); Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 434–39 (1971) (ruling that official state actions
that harm a person’s reputation are unconstitutional without adequate process to protect against abuse or mistake).
40. See Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 1, 18–20 (2006); see also Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due
Process and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme Court’s Search for Interpretive
Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303, 305 (2001) (defining free-standing due
process rights).
41. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27–31 (1967).
42. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260–66 (1970).
43. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563–72 (1974).
44. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577–84 (1975).
45. Compare Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (ruling that
an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to terminating disability benefits),
with Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266–71 (ruling that a quasi-judicial hearing is necessary prior to terminating welfare benefits). See also SULLIVAN & MASSARO,
supra note 10.
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ing in favor of [additional procedural protections] are so extraordinarily weighty as to overcome the balance struck by
46
Congress.” While these frameworks vary, on a basic level they
always act as a check against legislative overreach by weighing
the nature of the interest at risk against the interests of society
to determine whether the existing procedures in question are
47
adequate.
The most famous procedural due process framework, one
that applies to most civil and administrative proceedings,
48
comes from Mathews v. Eldridge. Eldridge dealt with the constitutionally required procedures for terminating Social Security benefits. In determining what procedural protections are required, the Court weighed three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
49
would entail.

Using this balancing approach, the Eldridge Court determined
that a formal hearing was unnecessary prior to the termination
of Social Security disability benefits partly because the procedures in place were adequate to ensure against an erroneous
50
deprivation and partly because the nature of the interest did
51
not mandate more rigorous process.
Outcomes in decisions employing the Eldridge balancing
approach thus depend upon the careful weighing of many moving pieces and can appear to a casual observer to produce inconsistent rulings. Cases that deal with the right to counsel in
46. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 177–78 (1994) (quoting
Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 44 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted)). For an analysis of the Court’s deference to procedural protections extended to prisoners, see Claire Deason, Note, Unexpected Consequences: The
Constitutional Implications of Federal Prison Policy for Offenders Considering
Abortion, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1377, 1392–93 (2009).
47. For example, in Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992), the Court
claimed to use a more deferential standard for ruling on procedural due process questions in the criminal context. Id. at 445–46 (citing Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197, 201–02 (1977)). The dissent pointed out, however, that the
majority had essentially used the same balancing test as it had in noncriminal contexts. Id. at 461–63 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
48. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
49. Id. at 335 (emphasis added).
50. Id.at 344–47.
51. Id. at 340–43.
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non-criminal hearings are a perfect example of such inconsistencies. Due process of law demands that people have a right to
52
counsel in juvenile detention hearings and in civil commit53
ments of mentally ill prisoners, but not in parental termina54
55
tion hearings, good-time credit revocation hearings, or civil
56
contempt hearings. Additionally, there is only a right to an attorney in parole and probation revocation hearings in compli57
cated cases or as otherwise deemed necessary by a judge. In
determining whether due process demands that counsel be provided for a given deprivation hearing, the Court looks at many
important factors, such as the state’s interest in security, alternative procedural protections, and the nature and history of the
58
system of law in question. Importantly, the Court’s conclusions do not necessarily correlate with the magnitude of the interests involved. A probationer at risk of being erroneously sent
back to prison may have as much of a personal stake in his
freedom as a criminal defendant. But unlike a criminal defendant, a probationer is not due counsel because the Court was
concerned that attorneys would interfere with the state’s administration of a system that is supposed to be focused on
59
“nonpunitive rehabilitation.”
Given that the Due Process Clause is supposed to protect
against the arbitrary deprivation of rights, it is somewhat ironic that the Court has produced an inconsistent line of jurisprudence that requires different procedural protections in seeming60
ly identical situations. The Court’s most recent foray into this
61
terrain in Turner v. Rogers demonstrates the deficiencies and
practical implications of this approach. The Court’s decision
52. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 34–42 (1967).
53. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 496–97 (1980).
54. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 32–34 (1981).
55. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 569–70 (1974).
56. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2516–20 (2011).
57. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787–90 (1973).
58. See, e.g., id. at 787–90 (voicing a concern that introducing attorneys to
parole revocation hearings would make the hearing less focused on
“nonpunitive rehabilitation” and more adversarial). See generally Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (describing the traditional three part test).
59. See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 787–90.
60. See Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a
More Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111,
113 (1978) (“[T]he formulation of due process standards, especially in recent
years, has lacked the degree of symmetry, continuity, and principled content
that we have come to expect in the development of constitutional law.”).
61. Turner, 131 S. Ct. 2507.
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privileged practical considerations over the rights of the ac62
cused, and in doing so the Court strayed into territory better
left to the political branches. That the Court’s decision deviated
from its institutional competencies is demonstrated by the fact
that its practically minded decision may, in fact, produce impractical results. In a time of perpetually high unemployment
63
64
65
rates, government deficits, and overcrowded prisons, the
Court rejected a constitutional right to counsel that may have
prevented many indigent defendants from being sent to prison
for the “crime” of being unable to monetarily satisfy a court or66
der. The following sections will explore why the Court could
have found a constitution right to counsel in civil contempt proceedings, why it did not do so, and what that says about the
Court’s procedural due process jurisprudence.
II. TURNER V. ROGERS AND THE ELDRIDGE APPROACH
A. A PRE-TURNER ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
CIVIL CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS
Prior to Turner, there was growing hope among some
commentators that the Court would make positive steps toward
67
establishing a right to an attorney in all civil proceedings. For
those advocating a due process right to counsel in civil contempt proceedings, this optimism was especially warranted
62. See infra Part II.B.1.
63. Between October of 2010 and October of 2011, the unemployment rate
went down from 9.7% to 9.1%. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION—OCTOBER 2011, at 4 (2011), available at http://www
.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_11042011.pdf.
64. As a percentage of GDP, the federal deficit in 2009, 2010, and 2011
was 10.1%, 9%, and 8.7%, respectively. ELIZABETH COVE DELISLE ET AL.,
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, MONTHLY BUDGET REVIEW: FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 1
(2011), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/
2011_Nov_MBR.pdf.
65. The total number of incarcerated adults in America has grown from
1.93 million people in 2000 to 2.28 million people in 2009. LAUREN E. GLAZE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 2009, at 2 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/
cpus09.pdf.
66. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2520.
67. See, e.g., Laura K. Abel, A Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: Lessons
from Gideon v. Wainwright, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 527, 530–35
(2006) (noting that the factors that led the Supreme Court to overrule Betts in
Gideon, creating a right to counsel in criminal cases, were also present should
the Court revisit Lassiter with a desire to create a right to counsel in civil cases); Alba, supra note 15, at 1079–81 (arguing that a promising test case for a
Civil Gideon is available in the context of parental termination proceedings).
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given that the Court had indicated general support for such a
68
right when deprivation of physical liberty was at stake.
Turner was in some ways a perfect test case for this optimistic
prediction. The legal question before the Court was limited to
whether Turner had a right to an attorney and the facts indicated that he had been erroneously deprived of his liberty pre69
cisely because he lacked legal guidance. Leaving the delicate
science of tea-leaf reading and vote predicting aside, there was
a strong argument in favor of extending the right to counsel to
civil contempt proceedings using the Court’s Eldridge factors.
First, Turner clearly had an interest in his physical liberty
70
that is protected by the Due Process Clause. The question
then becomes how this interest is balanced using the utilitarian
Eldridge factors. A person’s interest in physical liberty usually
receives special consideration from the Court; in previous procedural due process cases, there was a presumption in favor of
enhanced procedural protections that include the right to an at71
torney. Only in those situations where the Court had determined that the liberty interest was diluted—for example where
the individual was already subject to liberty limitations enforced through terms of parole or probation—did the Court de72
termine that an attorney was unnecessary. Turner’s liberty
interest, however, was absolute and one would predict that the
Court would weigh the remaining Eldridge factors accordingly.
The second Eldridge factor looks at “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute pro73
cedural safeguards.” The risk of an erroneous deprivation in
civil contempt proceedings is high—especially in the child support context—because the litigants in such situations are likely
to be less affluent and less educated than the general popula74
tion. Civil contempt hearings often deal with issues that lay68. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25–27 (1981) (noting
that previous due process cases provide a strong presumption that a risk of
liberty deprivation through incarceration or commitment requires strong procedural safeguards like the right to counsel).
69. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2513–14.
70. See id. at 2518.
71. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26–27.
72. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 783–91 (1973) (ruling that
there is no per se right to an attorney in parole or probation revocation hearings).
73. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
74. See Elizabeth G. Patterson, Civil Contempt and the Indigent Child
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75

people may struggle with. The question is typically not as
76
simple as quantifying the litigant’s assets. Rather, the Court
must determine the litigant’s ability to pay, something more
akin to a legal question that is less easily answered than a
77
purely financial question. Turner himself demonstrates how
an untrained litigant in a pseudo-adversarial proceeding is at
risk of being found in contempt of court due to an incorrect as78
sessment of his ability to pay. Providing litigants with attorneys is an effective means of protecting their rights and preventing such erroneous deprivations because they speak the
language of the court and provide competent, timely, and es79
sential services before, during, and after the hearing.
The third Eldridge factor—the government’s interests—
usually weighs against adding procedural protections because
80
of the associated costs or risks to the state. Here, the direct
costs of paying for the attorneys and the indirect costs of creating further delay and litigation provide strong arguments
against requiring publicly appointed attorneys in civil contempt
81
proceedings. These concerns are mitigated, however, by the
government’s very real interest in not feeding and housing a
prisoner who does not deserve to be imprisoned. All else being
equal, the government has a strong interest in keeping an in-

Support Obligor: The Silent Return of Debtor’s Prison, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 95, 106 (2008) (noting that large percentages of “poor non-custodial fathers lack a high-school degree or GED”).
75. See id. at 138–39 (noting that seemingly simple cases can be “far beyond the abilities of the indigent layperson to effectively present”).
76. Although for some this also can be a complicated task requiring thirdparty assistance. See id. at 107–08 (discussing the difficulties in obtaining accurate information about an indigent parent’s income and assets).
77. See id. at 107–12.
78. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2513–14 (2011); Judith Resnik,
Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion,Wal-Mart v. Dukes,
and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 103 (2011) (noting that Turner
spoke less than 200 words during the proceeding, which lasted mere minutes).
79. See Robert Monk, The Indigent Defendant’s Right to Court-Appointed
Counsel in Civil Contempt Proceedings for Nonpayment of Child Support, 50
U. CHI. L. REV. 326, 333 (1983) (claiming that an attorney can provide
“factfinding, prepare and present defenses, present credible witnesses and evidence, monitor the actions of the court, make timely objections and motions,
and take immediate actions if the court wrongfully confines his client”).
80. See, e.g., Berg v. Shearer, 755 F.2d 1343, 1347 (8th Cir. 1985) (stating
that, although financial burdens on the government are not controlling, they
are an important factor within the Eldridge framework).
81. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787–90 (1973).
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nocent person out of jail given the huge financial drain that the
82
prison system already takes on state and federal coffers.
It would be impossible to predict with certainty how the
Court would balance these factors given the preceding arguments, but pro-Civil Gideon commentators and litigants like
Turner can be excused for hoping that the decision would favor
the right to an attorney. Considering the strong liberty interests in question, the traditional use of attorneys to protect
against erroneous deprivations of liberty, and the somewhat
mitigated counterbalancing government interests, Turner
seemed like a good test case for expanding procedural due process protections. The next section details why the Court ruled
against such an expansion and explores some counterarguments to the Court’s ruling. The purpose of discussing Turner
in depth is not to critique the decision per se—indeed, the
above analysis admits that the outcome was never guaranteed—but instead to critique the Court’s fundamental approach
to such decisions. Only after understanding why the Court
ruled as it did can we move to expand access to justice.
B. THE TURNER REJECTION OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Turner decision was officially a five-four split, but the
Court unanimously ruled that the Due Process Clause does not
require that litigants have an attorney during a civil contempt
83
proceeding even though they risk imprisonment as a result.
The five-Justice majority ruled that procedural protections
above and beyond those afforded to Turner were required and
thus remanded the case, whereas the four-Justice dissent
84
would have declined to prescribe any additional protections.
This section analyzes how both the majority and dissent framed
the issues and used the Eldridge balancing test and suggests
brief counterarguments to their reasoning. In doing so, it
demonstrates how easily manipulated the Eldridge factors are.
1. The Majority’s Turner Analysis
The majority’s opinion is notable because it takes a less
methodical approach than is typical in applying the Eldridge
82. In 2001, the average annual cost of housing a prison inmate in a state
prison was $22,650 per inmate. JAMES J. STEPHAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
NCJ 202949, STATE PRISON EXPENDITURES, 2001, at 1 (2004), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/spe01.pdf.
83. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2520–21.
84. See id. at 2519–21.
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85

factors. First, the majority rephrased the Eldridge factors and
omitted the portion of the third factor that refers explicitly to
burdens on the government, styling it instead as a general
86
“countervailing interests” prong. Second, in explaining why
Turner’s liberty interests are insufficient to require appointed
counsel, the Court combined the second two Eldridge factors—
the comparative efficacy of the proposed procedural protection
and the “countervailing interests” in requiring such protec87
tions—into one counterbalancing factor. The Court’s subsequent analysis was thus undertaken with a diluted version of
the already lenient Eldridge factors, one that stacked the deck
in favor of arguments against expanding the right to counsel.
The Court discussed three counterbalancing factors that,
when combined, outweighed Turner’s liberty interests and
mandated against expanding the right to an attorney. First, it
noted that an attorney is often unnecessary because the procedures used to determine if a litigant qualifies for a stateappointed attorney due to indigence are almost identical to the
procedures that can prove he is unable to pay for child sup88
port. In most civil contempt cases, if a litigant can show he
qualifies for an attorney he likely does not need an attorney.
Second, in many civil contempt proceedings the opposing litigant is not the government but is instead a private citizen who
89
is also often unrepresented. Providing an attorney to the litigant at risk of being found in contempt “could create an asymmetry of representation that would ‘alter significantly the na90
ture of the proceeding,’” including slowing the proceedings
and possibly making them less fair “by increasing the risk of a
decision that would erroneously deprive a family of the support
91
that it is entitled to receive.” Third, the Court determined that
substitute procedures, including the use of forms “to elicit relevant financial information” or the assistance of a non-legal,
85. After introducing the balancing framework, the portion of the Eldridge opinion that analyzed the three factors stretched across six pages of the
Supreme Court Reporter whereas the same portion of text in Turner consisted
of three pages. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2518–20; Mathews v. Eldridge, 96 S.
Ct. 893, 905–10 (1976).
86. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2518.
87. See id. at 2518–19.
88. See id. at 2519 (discussing the federal law requiring criminal defendants to evidence their indigence in order to receive counsel).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2511 (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (1973)).
91. Id. at 2519.
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neutral social worker would be sufficient to meet the require92
ments of the Due Process Clause. The balance of these three
considerations, according to the Court, outweighed Turner’s in93
terests in having counsel.
Even with the lenient version of the Eldridge factors used
by the Court, there are strong counterarguments to the majority’s concerns. The Court’s first and third arguments are both
premised on the belief that alternative procedural protections
are sufficient to protect against erroneous deprivations because
the legal questions under review are relatively simple. First,
with regard to whether the litigant is indigent, it is far from
clear that procedural protections that fall short of providing an
attorney would be adequate. As discussed above, many litigants
in civil contempt proceedings are not only indigent but also uneducated and inexperienced in courtroom process and are possibly unaware of how relevant their indigence is to the outcome
94
of the hearing. And because the key question in these proceedings is not just the income of the litigant but is instead a qualitative question of the litigant’s ability to pay, a mechanical process involving the completion of forms and nothing more is
95
insufficient to protect the litigant’s rights. The mere fact that
Turner v. Rogers made it to the Supreme Court to begin with
shows that paper protections, which were present to a degree in
Turner’s original contempt proceeding, are not a panacea if
there are no individuals willing and able to properly enforce
96
them. Judges face natural constraints on their time and ability and are subject to personal inclinations and external pres97
sures that may be adverse to the obligor. In the absence of
zealous counsel, there remains always the potential that a
judge will overlook important factors that are not easily quanti98
fiable and mistakenly rule that the litigant is able to pay.
The majority’s second fundamental argument against
providing counsel is that the presence of an attorney would
92. Id. at 2519–20.
93. Id. at 2520.
94. See Patterson, supra note 74, at 120–21.
95. See id. at 136–38 (suggesting alternative methods for assessing a litigant’s credibility in making ability to pay determinations).
96. The judge in Turner’s original hearing did not even fill out the onestatement, pre-written form to indicate whether Turner was able to make his
support payments. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2514.
97. See Patterson, supra note 74, at 121–26 (describing concerns over judicial bias against obligors in civil contempt hearings).
98. See id.
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change the dynamics of the hearing and potentially create an
asymmetry of representation between the parties. Although the
Court’s concern for the rights of the custodial parent are laudable, the Court mischaracterizes the conflict and hence the remedy as being purely between two individuals. A civil contempt
proceeding is designed to indirectly benefit the opposing litigant but is more directly a means of ensuring compliance with
99
a court order. As such, it can be more accurately characterized
as the State using its monopoly on the legitimate use of force to
coerce an individual to adhere to a state-sanctioned order.
While it is important to be concerned about the asymmetry of
representation between the litigants, the more relevant adversarial relationship in contempt proceedings is between the individual and the State.
Here it is essential to also remember that the original Eldridge factors require a balance between the individual’s interest and the burdens on the government and not, as the Turner
court phrased it, a balance of burdens generally. Using a faithful formulation of the Eldridge factors, the custodial parent’s
interests count, at best, as proxies for the government’s interests. The Court impliedly recognized this fact when it stated
that the hearing was “ultimately for [the custodial parent’s]
benefit” but that the parent can only “encourage” the court to
“enforce its order through contempt” as she is not entirely in
100
control of the proceeding. But to the extent that the Court or
government is concerned with the custodial parent’s rights it
should be noted that states are free to adopt rules that would
provide indigent litigants on both sides with state-appointed
101
attorneys.
The appropriate question before the Court then is not what
Turner’s procedural due process rights are in light of Rogers’s
counterbalancing interests, but instead what Turner’s rights
102
are in light of the government’s interests. The government
99. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2525–27 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (outlining
the important role that civil contempt proceedings play in states’ child support
schemes).
100. Id. at 2519 (majority opinion).
101. See Resnik, supra note 78, at 160.
102. See Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. 1, 50
(1992). Professor Rutherford argues that the Court frames conflicts as being
between two relatively powerless groups in order to “conceal the benefit to the
powerful.” Id. In Turner, the Court framed the conflict as being between the
relatively powerless groups of individual litigants in a child support hearing
whereas the more relevant conflict is between an indigent litigant and the
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bears the administrative costs of added litigation due to the
presence of an attorney and the direct financial costs of providing an attorney in the first place. Comparing an individual’s
subjective interest in avoiding imprisonment to the state’s objective fiscal interests is an inherently problematic exercise
made more difficult by the majority’s decision to avoid providing any estimate of the costs that would be incurred by a broad
103
rule requiring attorneys in civil contempt hearings. The majority instead refers to the “delay” associated with attorneys
and obliquely mentions other “drawbacks inherent in recogniz104
ing an automatic right to counsel.” One would expect that, for
a determination based on costs, the Court would provide at
least some statistics about the cost of state-appointed attorneys
or engage in a more detailed discussion of such fiscal considerations. Instead, we are left with a decision that downplays the
importance of counsel without adequately establishing the so105
cial costs of providing attorneys.
2. The Dissent’s Turner Analysis
The majority’s analysis on the right to counsel was supplemented by Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion. The dissent
agreed with the majority’s ruling that there is no categorical
right to an attorney in civil cases that risk incarceration but
106
dissented over what alternative remedies should be available.
The dissent added to the majority’s arguments that the “settled
107
usage” of contempt proceedings does not require counsel and
also argued that a rule requiring counsel in all proceedings that
can result in incarceration would make the Sixth Amendment
108
superfluous.

government. See supra text accompanying note 100.
103. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2518–20 (discussing the consequences of
providing counsel in terms of delay of litigation rather than costs to the government).
104. Id. at 2519–20.
105. The Court ignores, for example, the opportunity costs of facilitating
the alliance of a middle class interest group of attorneys with indigent litigants and the potential that such an alliance could lead to lobbying for more
fair and just civil contempt procedures. See Rutherford, supra note 102, at 50;
see also supra note 82 and accompanying text.
106. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2522–24 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas believed that the Court should not have even reached the question of alternative remedies. Id. at 2524.
107. Id. at 2521–22.
108. Id. at 2522.
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The “settled usage” argument implicates a larger debate
over the details of historical and contemporary practices. It
would require that deprivation procedures be only as rigorous
as those practices that are “firmly rooted” in the practices of
109
our nation. Although persuasive, the argument is not controlling because the Court has not adopted the “settled usage” ap110
proach. Indeed, only Justices Thomas and Scalia support its
111
use over the Eldridge factors. The dissent’s argument relating to the Sixth Amendment, however, deserves attention here.
First, the only factor that differentiated a civil contempt
hearing from a criminal contempt hearing in Turner’s case was
whether he had the ability to avoid the remedy by paying his
112
child support payments. If Turner was unable to meet the
court order and make the demanded payments, he was incapable of avoiding his sentence and was doomed to serve for a definite period of time, making his sentence more akin to a crimi113
nal contempt sanction.
But Turner did not receive any
procedural protections that would have been afforded him in a
criminal contempt hearing. Thus, Turner either can make his
payments, at which point the hearing is civil and he does not
get an attorney, or he cannot pay, at which point the technically civil contempt hearing is more aptly considered a criminal
114
contempt hearing for which he should have counsel. Without
counsel or other enhanced procedural protections, neither
Turner nor the judge reliably knows whether he can pay and
thus whether he deserves an attorney. Turner is faced with the
catch-22 of needing an attorney to prove that he has a right to
an attorney.
Second, the concern that the Due Process Clause would
subsume the Sixth Amendment is only relevant for as long as
the Court interprets the Sixth Amendment to give defendants a

109. See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 197–99 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (emphasizing the importance of considering historical practice in
making due process determinations).
110. See Israel, supra note 40, at 407–09.
111. Aside from Justice Scalia, no dissenting Justice in Turner signed on to
Part I-A in Justice Thomas’s dissent where he discussed the “settled usage”
approach. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2520.
112. See Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631–33 (1988) (explaining the factors by which relief is characterized as criminal or civil); see
also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 38–40.
113. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 38–42.
114. See id. at 42.
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right to counsel only if they are at risk of being incarcerated.
The Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment would provide distinct protections, however, if the Court expanded the
Sixth Amendment to provide a right to counsel in all criminal
cases whether or not the punishment involved incarceration.
The concern then is less over standard practices of statutory
construction and more over juggling a constantly changing,
piecemeal evolution of Court interpretations of the Constitution. A ruling on this ground alone would be the antithesis of a
functional and reasonable application of constitutional rights.
Finally, the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause
have unique functions within the constitutional framework despite the possibility of their protections temporarily overlapping. The Sixth Amendment exists as a hard and fast threshold
requirement for all criminal hearings, but the Due Process
Clause exists as a flexible and permeable standard that can
change over time, allow for exceptions, and mold its require116
ments to different contexts. The Due Process Clause provides
an important general check against the government and attempts to ensure that the nation continually strives to provide
the fundamentals of a fair hearing even as the idea of “fairness”
changes over time. The Sixth Amendment, in contrast, provides
a very specific and durable check against the government that
cannot change along with social conceptions of the importance
of attorneys.
The dissent’s arguments supplement but cannot replace
the majority’s opinion so long as the settled usage approach
remains a minority doctrine. But despite the limitations of the
dissent’s and the majority’s decision, it should be emphasized
that the Turner Court did not use the Eldridge factors in an
obviously impermissible fashion. The majority’s decision treats
the balancing framework as being somewhat more elastic and
less demanding than previous decisions, but nothing in its ruling contradicts the spirit of the test. The Turner decision is an
expression of Eldridge working as designed. The very fact that
the Eldridge factors make such a decision possible illustrates
how the Court’s framework for most procedural due process
115. See generally Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 30–38 (1972) (arguing that legal and practical factors of even petty criminal offenses mandate the
“presence of counsel to insure the accused a fair trial” but refusing to rule on
whether counsel is required when there is no risk of imprisonment).
116. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 65–67 (1932) (noting that rights
protected by the Due Process Clause and the Sixth and First Amendments
overlap without making any portion of the Constitution superfluous).
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cases is not adequately representing the purpose and function
of the Due Process Clause. The next section discusses more
generally the pitfalls of the Eldridge factors using Turner and
other right to counsel cases as examples and makes the case
that an alternative, rights-based approach to due process questions would be preferable.
C. TURNER, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL, AND THE DEFICIENCIES OF
THE ELDRIDGE APPROACH
Given the interests at stake and the traditional importance
of attorneys in the American court system, there are strong arguments in favor of extending the right to counsel to encompass
civil contempt proceedings that risk incarceration on due process grounds. The Turner decision deviated from the hopes of
reformers looking to expand the right to counsel. A closer look
at the Turner ruling and the Court’s use of the Eldridge factors
demonstrates how the application of the Court’s procedural due
process jurisprudence strays from the original purpose of the
Due Process Clause as well. A realistic if critical understanding
of the Court’s jurisprudence is necessary to formulate a practical approach to expanding the right to counsel.
Criticisms of the Eldridge approach are as old as the El117
dridge case itself, but the discussion over Eldridge should expand and evolve along with the doctrine itself. A review of the
Court’s decisions shows that the Eldridge factors allow too
much flexibility to the Court because they give it wide latitude
to define and characterize the interests at stake, to weigh those
interests against each other, and to determine the appropriate
procedures given the results of its balancing test. Because the
118
Court has such great and self-proclaimed flexibility along
three axes, it can produce an outcome to which it is ideological119
ly predisposed.
117. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus
for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in
Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976).
118. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“It has been said so
often by this Court and others as not to require citation of authority that due
process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands.”).
119. But see id. (“To say that the concept of due process is flexible does not
mean that judges are at large to apply it to any and all relationships. Its flexibility is in its scope once it has been determined that some process is due; it is
a recognition that not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for
the same kind of procedure.”).
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If a given Court is predisposed to rule against expanding
procedural protections, it can downplay the interest of the individual. In Addington v. Texas, for example, the Court ruled
that a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard was unnecessary
for civil commitment hearings because the liberty interests of
the individual were tempered by the importance of providing
professional help to those mentally ill individuals who need
120
it. Similarly, the Court can diminish concerns over the risk of
an erroneous deprivation by focusing on the procedures already
in place or on the character of the system itself. In Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, for example, the Court was persuaded that substitute
procedures combined with the generally rehabilitative approach of the parole system would make the required presence
of attorneys in all revocation hearings unnecessary and possi121
bly harmful. The Court can also place a premium on the
state’s interests, as it did in Wolff v. McDonnell. In McDonnell,
the Court ruled that administrative costs and harms to “correctional goals” outweigh inmates’ liberty interests such that only
illiterate inmates or those facing “complex” issues are due the
assistance of other inmates or staff members, not a trained at122
torney, in prison disciplinary hearings.
These determinations bear a resemblance to the types of
policy considerations more typically associated with the legislative branch. But unlike elected policy makers, the Turner case
demonstrated that the Court need not engage in rigorous factfinding much less provide any empirical support for its conclu123
sions. Finally, as the McDonnell ruling shows, even if the
Court does determine that the balance of interests argue in favor of requiring the sought after procedures, it has great lati-

120. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428–31 (1979) (stating that it
cannot be said “that it is much better for a mentally ill person to ‘go free’ than
for a mentally normal person to be committed”).
121. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 783–91 (1973). Although the
Scarpelli case was decided before the formalization of the Eldridge factors, the
Court’s approach remains similar. See id. at 788 (noting that “due process is
not so rigid as to require that the significant interests in informality, flexibility, and economy must always be sacrificed,” a similar notion to the balancing
of interests the Court completes using the Eldridge factors).
122. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 569–70 (1974).
123. See Cynthia R. Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 189, 196 (1991) (noting that the Court actually discouraged the use of
statistics and empirical evidence and that outcomes of Eldridge cases are “virtually impossible to predict”).
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tude in determining when and to what extent they are en124
forced.
As implied above, the Court can selectively add weight to
one or more aspects of the Eldridge factors to produce an outcome that it was predisposed to reach. As some members of the
Court have cautioned, flexible decision-making frameworks invite judges to substitute their own policy preferences for those
of the democratically elected branches in an arena where they
are neither constitutionally entitled nor institutionally capa125
ble. Using a basic (if blunt) assumption that an ideologically
“conservative” judge is less likely to want to expand procedural
due process whereas an ideologically “liberal” judge is more
likely to want to expand procedural due process rights, the
question becomes whether a multi-factored framework like Eldridge constrains such judges’ ability to single-mindedly pursue
126
those goals. If the framework does not restrain such behavior,
then judges hearing a procedural due process case would be
less like neutral arbiters applying established rules to a given
fact pattern and more like policymakers using their public authority to dictate their private will.
Anecdotal evidence of the application of the Eldridge factors shows that the framework is not restrictive. In Vitek v.
Jones, for example, the Court ruled that an inmate has a statutorily-created liberty interest in not being involuntarily com127
mitted to a mental hospital without a fair hearing. The controlling opinion on whether inmates were due counsel in such
hearings, however, ruled that inmates are not due licensed
counsel to represent their interest but instead that due process
requires independent and competent assistance of the sort that
128
can be provided by a mental health professional. To give con124. See Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 790–91 (identifying how the state authority
should determine whether a parolee is due counsel on a case-by-case basis);
Farina, supra note 123, at 195–96 (noting that “the question of what process is
due is entirely separated from the question of whether process is due”).
125. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 575–77 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accusing the Court of engaging in “constitutional improvisation” that
increases the power of the Court and arguing that judicial creation of procedures using the Due Process Clause “saps the vitality of government by the
people”).
126. See generally Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values
and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 559–
63 (1989) (measuring Justices’ ideologies based on newspaper editorials about
the Justices).
127. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 487–94 (1980).
128. See id. at 498–500 (Powell, J., concurring).
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text to that ruling, one should remember that adults are gener129
ally due counsel in civil commitment hearings. The plurality
coalition in Vitek, which was in favor of providing legal assis130
tance, consisted of justices generally considered to be moder131
ate or liberal whereas the controlling opinion was authored
132
by the slightly more conservative Justice Powell and the dissenting Justices included the more moderate Justice Stewart
133
and “conservative” Justice Rehnquist. Powell also authored
the Scarpelli decision in which the Court ruled that parolees
and probationers are due counsel on only a case-by-case ba134
sis. The liberal Justice Douglas, however, echoing his arguments in the related Morrisey case, argued that parolees and
135
probationers are due counsel in revocation hearings. And certainly the vote distribution in Turner, in which Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan held in favor of
enhanced procedural protections over the dissent of Justices
Thomas, Scalia, Roberts, and Alito, gives rise to similar con136
cerns over the malleability of the Eldridge factors.
Looking at Turner v. Rogers in this light, the problem is
not with the Turner Court and whether it was wrong in how it
applied the Eldridge framework. The problem is with the
framework itself and how it is impossible to prove that it was
used incorrectly. The purpose of the Due Process Clause is to
137
prevent arbitrary government authority. But given how difficult it would be to predict how the Eldridge factors will be ap138
plied —much less establish that they had been applied wrongly—it seems clear that the Court’s own test for the Due Process
129. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 627 (1979) (citing Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967)).
130. See Vitek, 445 U.S. at 496–97.
131. The plurality Justices were Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens.
Id. at 482. For analysis of and data on judges’ ideological predispositions, see
Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via
Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL.
ANALYSIS 134, 145–52 (2002), available at http://mqscores.wustl.edu/media/
pa02.pdf.
132. See Vitek, 445 U.S. at 497; Martin & Quinn, supra note 131, at 145–
48.
133. See Vitek, 445 U.S. at 500; Martin & Quinn, supra note 131, at 145–
48.
134. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 778, 783–91 (1973).
135. See id. at 791 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Martin & Quinn, supra note
131, at 145.
136. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2512 (2011).
137. See supra notes 20–23 and accompanying text.
138. Farina, supra note 123, at 196.
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Clause is itself arbitrarily applied. Worse yet, the Eldridge factors may mask what would otherwise be deemed inappropriate
139
policy-making from an unelected branch. Broader principles
of the Rule of Law, of which procedural due process is a component, demand predictable decisionmaking and a legitimate
140
source of power for creating new policy. A judicial doctrine
that creates unpredictable outcomes with broad policy implications fails to meet the Rule of Law aims of the Clause from
which it is derived.
It is evident that the Eldridge test deviates from the original purpose of the Due Process Clause when one compares it to
procedural due process approaches in other areas of law like
the Court’s jurisprudence on proper notice. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., for example, the Court ruled
that notice of pending litigation is adequate if it is “reasonably
141
certain to inform those affected.” This standard does not re142
quire actual notice, but it also does not require the Court to
engage in a careful balancing test and weigh the burdens of the
entity charged with providing notice against the interests of the
person to whom notice is due. The test is instead simple: was
the form of notice reasonably likely to “inform those affect143
ed”? If not, then the notice is constitutionally defective. Such
an approach is more consistent with the underlying purpose of
the Due Process Clause because it looks only to whether the
government action is likely to deprive a citizen of a protected
right arbitrarily and removes the extra element of Eldridge
that asks whether protecting against an erroneous deprivation
144
would be too costly. A Mullane-style standard also has the
advantage of putting the onus on the Court for justifying a de139. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2524–25 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(chastising the majority for using the Eldridge factors to require procedural
protections not briefed or argued by the parties to the suit); see also Farina,
supra note 123, at 235 (noting that utility-driven analysis is better undertaken
by the political branches and that the Court’s Eldridge analysis can be construed as “undisciplined judicial interference in local and national governance”).
140. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS,
THEORY 91–101 (2004) (discussing several conceptions of the Rule of Law).
141. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315
(1950).
142. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 170–73 (2002).
143. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315.
144. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (stating that the
“[g]overnments’ interest . . . in conserving scarce fiscal and administrative resources is a factor that must be weighed”).
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parture from an otherwise clear rule. Instead of weighing the
equities de novo in each case, a standards-based approach is
more likely to produce a stronger line of precedent and hence
145
greater judicial restraint.
Having established that the Eldridge approach is generally
deficient in securing the promises of the Due Process Clause
and specifically problematic in the case of expanding access to
counsel in civil contempt hearings post-Turner, the next issue
is whether taking tangible steps would improve either situation.
III. RESTORING THE PROMISE OF THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE AND IMPROVING ACCESS TO JUSTICE
Part II argued that the Turner case demonstrates two related problems—that the Eldridge framework departs from
purpose of Due Process Clause and that this framework was
used to limit important procedural protections for litigants facing imprisonment in civil contempt hearings. The solutions to
both problems are also related. The same steps that would expand the right to counsel may also help convince the Court to
alter its approach to procedural due process cases to one that
emphasizes the protection of individual rights from arbitrary
government deprivations. Part III.A introduces an alternative
to the Eldridge factors, one that is modeled after the Court’s
substantive due process cases and one that would provide more
restrained and transparent decisionmaking in procedural due
process cases. Part III.B gives practical suggestions for advancing the Court towards the new approach and, just as importantly, for expanding the right to counsel to people like Michael Turner.
A. AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE ELDRIDGE APPROACH
The Court’s procedural due process framework should be
replaced with something similar to the Court’s substantive due
process jurisprudence because doing so would create more con146
sistent and principled rulings. The Due Process Clause was
145. The Dusenbury Court, for example, used the seventy-two-year-old
Mullane precedent as support for the argument that certified mail is an adequate means of service, citing a long line of case-precedent stemming from
Mullane and dating back to 1956. See Dusenbury, 534 U.S. at 169–70.
146. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Fundamental Property Rights, 85
GEO. L.J. 555, 624 (1997) (noting that others, including Professor Van Alstyne,
have argued that due process itself should receive Due Process Clause protec-
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intended to protect citizens against arbitrary government action, a goal that entails protecting both substantive and proce147
dural rights. There is little reason outside of historical accident why the Court should use different analytical frameworks
148
for the two types of rights. The Eldridge approach in particular has been inadequate to the task of protecting against arbitrary government deprivations both because the framework itself produces arbitrary or at least difficult to predict outcomes
and because it gives too much weight to the interests of government when ruling on the rights and interests of individuals.
Justices Scalia and Thomas are already on record as supporting
an alternative, historically-grounded approach to procedural
149
due process cases. An approach modeled after substantive
due process jurisprudence can accommodate their desires without stagnating the Court’s jurisprudence in the procedures and
customs of times past.
In contrast to the Eldridge approach, the Court’s jurisprudence on substantive due process rights begins, appropriately,
with an analysis of whether and to what extent the right is
“fundamental” and, based on that finding, proceeds to apply the
150
appropriate level of scrutiny to the law curtailing the right.
tions). Others have argued that the Equal Protection Clause may offer support
for procedural rights in that arbitrary procedures are likely to treat similarly
situated people differently, but “to the extent that a decision maker treats all
applicants in an arbitrary fashion, it is unlikely that courts would find an
equal protection violation.” Virginia T. Vance, Note, Applications for Benefits:
Due Process, Equal Protection, and the Right to be Free from Arbitrary Procedures, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 883, 912 (2004) (citing William Van Alstyne,
Cracks in “The New Property”: Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative
State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 451 (1977)).
147. See supra Part I.A.
148. Cf. Mashaw, supra note 117, at 47 n.61 (explaining that the Court’s
procedural due process jurisprudence was originally focused on traditions but
that, due to an increase of government functions for which there were “no
compelling historical analogies,” the Court was forced to develop a more flexible approach so as to avoid being “a stumbling block to ‘progress’” (citing Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1877)).
149. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2521–22 (2011) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (claiming that an attorney is not due under the Due Process
Clause because there is no evidence that attorneys are appointed in contempt
hearings according to the “settled usage” of the “process of law” (quoting Weiss
v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 197 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring))).
150. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (noting that the government can infringe upon a “fundamental liberty” interest
only if the infringement is “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest” and that “[o]ur Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices thus provide the crucial ‘guideposts for responsible decision making[]’ that direct and
restrain our exposition of the Due Process Clause” (citations omitted)).
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Thus the first benefit in comparison to the Eldridge factors is
that the fundamental rights approach “avoids the need for
151
complex balancing of competing interests in every case.” If
the individual interests are “fundamental,” the government policies that curtail them must be “narrowly tailored to serve a
152
compelling state interest.” If not, the government need only
show that its policies have a reasonable relationship to a legit153
imate state interest in order to justify its actions. The determination of whether the rights are fundamental lets the Court
know whether to tip the scales in favor of the government or
the individual, making the subsequent balancing inquiry more
154
straightforward. The Eldridge factors, in contrast, force the
Court to undertake the same balancing approach in each case,
relying on often contradictory precedent to determine how
much weight to give to each particular interest in relation to
155
each other.
By providing two distinct stages of analysis—a determination of whether the right is fundamental and then balancing
that right against the government’s interests—the fundamental rights approach also produces more consistent and trans156
parent jurisprudence. As discussed above, the Eldridge factors present several analytical levers that the Court can
manipulate to reach a conclusion, making the prediction and
157
critique of the Court’s decisions difficult. In order to understand a procedural due process case or to appropriately apply
or distinguish it as a precedential case, one must fully understand the value and relative weight that the Court ascribed to
the individual rights in question, the government’s interests,
and the costs and efficacy of additional procedural safe158
guards. The combination of those elements provides too many
permutations to make for good, clear, and binding precedent.
151. Id. at 722.
152. Id. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
153. See id. at 722 (creating “a threshold requirement—that a challenged
state action implicate a fundamental right—before requiring more than a reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest to justify the action”).
154. See id.
155. See supra Part II.C.
156. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722 (noting that the Court’s substantive
due process “approach tends to rein in the subjective elements that are necessarily present in due process judicial review”).
157. See supra Part II.C.
158. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (outlining the need
to weigh all three of these factors).
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The fundamental rights approach is comparatively straightforward: certain rights are or are not fundamental, and the determination of whether a right is fundamental always leads to
the application of either a very strict or a more lax level of scrutiny. The original determination of whether a right is fundamental is often politically charged and contentious, but the
analysis itself is theoretically easier to understand and apply.
Cynical observers of the Court’s behavior may feel that the
doctrine makes little difference and that Justices will pursue
ideologically driven and outcome-oriented rulings regardless of
159
the doctrinal framework. Regardless of whether the fundamental rights approach significantly alters the Court’s rulings,
it would at least refocus the narrative of its decisions to be
more consistent with the origin and purpose of the Due Process
Clause. The basic framework of fundamental rights analysis
centers the discussion on the rights of the individual. The Eldridge factors, in contrast, make no distinction or priority between the government’s and the individual’s interests: the two
are balanced simultaneously in a single-tiered test. The difference between the two approaches hearkens back to the original
debate over whether the Congress can define the “law of the
160
land” or if it is instead constrained by it. The Eldridge approach allows the Court to define individual rights as a function of how expensive it would be to protect them; if it would be
too onerous to provide attorneys to indigent civil litigants, then
161
civil litigants do not have a right to attorneys. The fundamental rights approach, in contrast, separately determines
whether the right is fundamental and only then weighs the
162
government’s interests against that right. Even if the Court
rules that the government’s interests outweigh the individual’s
rights, the Court is still acknowledging that such rights exist
and deserve respect. Defining rights separately from the costs
of protecting them is thus rhetorically more consistent with the
original purpose of the Due Process Clause.
The Court should thus abandon the Eldridge factors and
adopt an analytical framework that mirrors its substantive due
159. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 44–85 (2002) (critiquing the
“legal model” of judicial decision making).
160. See supra Part I.A.
161. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2518–20 (2011) (finding that
the Due Process Clause does not “automatically require the provision of counsel”).
162. See supra note 153.
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process approach. In a procedural due process case, the Court
should consider whether a person has a fundamental right to a
particular procedural protection given the interest in question.
As with its substantive due process jurisprudence, the Court
should consider whether the right is necessary for our ordered
system of liberty using both logic and historical and contemporary evidence, evidence that would include common law traditions, rules in the states and other countries, and the existence
163
of a growing social consensus on the issue. For example, if
most states provide an attorney for civil contempt hearings
when the litigant is at risk of being imprisoned, and if such
practice is growing nationally and internationally, the Court
may determine that such a right is fundamental. Consequently,
any legislation that curtails a right to an attorney in a civil con164
tempt hearing would be analyzed using strict scrutiny. This
does not mean that the government cannot curtail the right,
merely that it must use narrowly tailored means—in this context, likely alternative protections—and that the limitation
165
must be driven by a compelling state interest. If the government can show that providing an attorney would be prohibitively expensive and that the types of alternative protections outlined by the Turner majority are sufficient, the procedural
166
balance struck by Congress may survive strict scrutiny.
This type of analysis would not necessarily alter the outcomes of many of the Court’s procedural due process cases. Inmates likely do not have a fundamental right to the full panoply of procedural protections during good-time credit revocation
hearings, for example, and hence procedures in that context
would only receive rational-basis review and would likely be
167
upheld. Similarly, regardless of historical practices the Court
could determine that juveniles have a fundamental right to an
attorney in juvenile detention hearings because such a right is
163. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710–19 (1997)
(weighing similar evidence).
164. See id. at 721 (applying the narrow tailoring requirement).
165. See id.
166. In one study of strict scrutiny analysis, 25% of laws across all doctrinal areas were ruled to be constitutional by the Supreme Court despite being
analyzed using strict scrutiny, and 24% of laws that infringe upon fundamental rights survived strict scrutiny across all levels of federal courts. Adam
Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 826, 862–63 (2006).
167. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974) (“[T]he full panoply of rights due a defendant in [a criminal prosecution] does not apply.”).
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logically necessary for an ordered system of liberty. The fundamental rights approach would thus mimic, to a degree, the
context-based approach that the Court currently uses for pro169
cedural due process cases. Where logic, tradition and contemporary practice typically argue against providing rigorous
procedural protections—as is the case in prison administrative
hearings—the Court is unlikely to rule that litigants have a
fundamental right to enhanced procedural protections in such
situations. However, while procedural due process cases may
discuss the legal or administrative context as a free-floating
170
part of the decision, the fundamental rights approach would
require a more explicit and lengthy assessment in order to de171
termine whether the right is fundamental. In this way the
fundamental rights approach would merely take something
that the Court is already doing and make it more transparent
and more analytically rigorous.
While this approach might not appreciably alter the outcomes of cases, it would improve the Court’s process and legitimacy. A fundamental rights approach encourages better decision making because it places more importance on the rights
that the Due Process Clause is designed to protect and puts the
onus on the government to defend its procedural regimes—to
prove, in effect, that it is not acting arbitrarily or capriciously
172
to deprive a citizen of a protected interest. The fundamental
rights approach accomplishes this in distinct and logical steps:
determining first whether the right is fundamental and then
determining whether the balance struck by Congress is appro173
priate. Any departures from precedent or indications of overreach by the Court would be more easily identified and restrained because of this methodical approach. In contrast, the
168. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 34–42 (1967).
169. See supra Part I.B.
170. See, e.g., Wolff, 418 U.S. at 567–68 (discussing the states’ practice of
allowing cross-examination in prison disciplinary hearings).
171. Compare Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710–19 (1997)
(providing nine pages of analysis on the history of assisted suicide in order to
determine whether there is a substantive due process right to assisted suicide), with Wolff, 418 U.S. at 567–68 (providing a three-paragraph discussion
on the practice of cross-examination in prison disciplinary hearings to determine whether inmates have a right to cross-examine accusers).
172. See Mashaw, supra note 117, at 48–49 (arguing that the utilitarian
Eldridge factors are inconsistent with the Due Process Clause because the
Clause is intended to protect individual rights “in the face of contrary collective action”); supra note 156.
173. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722.
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Eldridge framework asks the Court to weigh both the individual’s and the government’s interests in one balancing step, comparing the substantive rights of an individual to the typically
174
economic interests of the government. This kind of apples-tooranges comparison lacks a common basis of measurement and
is flexible enough that it can be abused and manipulated with175
out the Court’s analysis appearing grossly arbitrary.
In short, the fundamental rights approach would force the
Court to “show its work,” making it easier to demonstrate why
its answer is “wrong.” A more transparent framework will constrain the Court to the extent that it is concerned with main176
taining its legitimacy as a neutral arbiter. Just as importantly, the Court’s due process rulings would be driven by a concern
for protecting individual rights and fundamental fairness. Instead of defining the boundaries of individual rights as a function of congressional policy, the Due Process Clause would be
employed to check and constrain the legislature. Even if the results were the same, the discussion would be more consistent
with the unique origins and purpose of the Due Process
177
Clause.
B. EXPANDING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND ALTERING THE
COURT’S PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS FRAMEWORK
Persuading the Court to change its approach to a class of
constitutional questions is a daunting task for which there is no
established procedure. One approach that could work would be
to establish that its Eldridge decisions are out of step with the
national consensus. Doing so may demonstrate to the Court
that it is not well-suited to engage in policy design or an independent balancing of equities and that it should instead recharacterize its analysis to something more limited and better
aligned with its core competencies. As in the post-Lochner decisions, the Court may determine that a more constrained role is

174. See Mashaw, supra note 117, at 48 (describing the utilitarian Eldridge
factors as narrow because they are too focused on costs and benefits as associated with accurate decisions rather than “soft variables,” like the value of process itself, for which there are no measurement “techniques”).
175. See supra notes 120–35 and accompanying text.
176. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992)
(“The Court’s power lies . . . in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows itself in the people’s acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to
determine what the Nation’s law means and to declare what it demands.”).
177. See supra Part I.A.
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178

a better one. The steps necessary to achieve this end are conveniently the same steps that would solve the more pressing
problem of inadequate representation for litigants in civil contempt trials.
As discussed above, the Court’s current approach to procedural due process questions provides it with wide latitude to
reach outcomes to which it is already ideologically predis179
posed. The Eldridge factors are malleable enough that there
is very little hope, outside of an ideological shift in the Court,
that new empirical evidence or innovative legal arguments
could persuade the Court to expand the constitutional right to
counsel to civil contempt proceedings in the near future. There
is, however, a multi-faceted approach to securing short-term
access to justice while laying the groundwork for a potential
shift in the Court’s jurisprudence on this issue over the long
term.
In the short term, the most practical, although costly,
method for ensuring access to justice is to pursue a state-bystate campaign to provide state-appointed attorneys in civil
contempt proceedings. This would include lobbying for state
laws that would guarantee attorneys in civil contempt hearings
and litigating the issue in state courts on state constitutional
grounds. Part of this lobbying effort would require reframing
180
the issue away from negative portrayals of “deadbeat dads”
and to focus instead on the more general and fundamental
question of rights protection. The Court in Mapp v. Ohio, for
example, expanded the issues presented by the case beyond the
narrow and less popular question of the right to possess obscene photographs and focused instead on the general question
of security in one’s home from unreasonable searches and sei181
zures. A similar framing of the right to counsel prior to being
incarcerated would advance the cause in the public’s eye. In a
similar vein, proponents of the right to counsel could compile
178. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 861–62 (explaining the basis for abandoning
well-established precedents and stating that “[t]he facts upon which [Lochnerera cases] had premised a constitutional resolution of social controversy had
proven to be untrue, and history’s demonstration of their untruth not only justified but required the new choice of constitutional principle [announced later]”).
179. See supra Part II.B.
180. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2526 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (referring to fathers who do not pay for child support as “deadbeat
dads” and “deadbeats”).
181. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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and promulgate information on the inefficiencies and social
182
costs associated with erroneously imprisoning people. Finally, successful lobbying efforts can utilize examples set by other
183
countries and support from sympathetic interest groups.
There are already several states that do provide attorneys in
184
civil contempt proceedings and several organized coalitions
and advocacy groups like the National Coalition for a Civil
185
Right to Counsel who are working on this issue. A renewed
campaign to expand access to counsel through legislation can
use the experiences of those states who have already established a right to an attorney in civil contempt proceedings and
the general enthusiasm of the Civil Gideon movement to per186
suade more states to adopt similar policies.
A companion method of expanding the right to counsel
would be to craft a litigation strategy that would whittle away
at the Turner holding in federal courts. The Turner Court was
careful to point out that while it was denying the right to an attorney in the case at hand, it was not passing any judgment on
cases where the support payment is owed to the State or where
187
the matters under consideration are “unusually complex.”
The Court also implied that an attorney may be required in
situations where the opposing litigant is represented by coun188
sel. Finding test cases that fit these exceptions may produce
182. In 2002, for example, men imprisoned for nonpayment of child support
accounted for 1.7% of the jail population. Elaine Sorensen, Rethinking Public
Policy Toward Low-Income Fathers in the Child Support Program, 20 J. POL’Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 604, 605 (2010).
183. See, e.g., Laura K. Abel & Lora J. Livingston, The Existing Civil Right
to Counsel Infrastructure, JUDGES’ J., Fall 2008, at 24, 24 (describing an ABA
resolution calling for “a civil right to counsel in cases concerning basic human
needs”); Alba, supra note 15, at 1088 (“Today, over fifty countries provide attorneys as a matter of right in many civil cases, including countries recently
freed from oppressive regimes, such as Poland and South Africa.” (citing Wade
Henderson, Keynote Address, The Evolution and Importance of Creating a
Civil Right to Counsel, 25 TOURO L. REV. 71, 79 (2009)).
184. See, e.g., Laura K. Abel, Toward a Right to Counsel in Civil Cases in
New York State: A Report of the New York State Bar Association, 25 TOURO L.
REV. 31, 67–69 (2009) (noting that New York extends the right to counsel in
most civil contempt hearings).
185. See, e.g., NAT’L COALITION FOR CIV. RIGHT TO COUNS., http://
civilrighttocounsel.org (last visited Apr. 1, 2013) (outlining the organization’s
mission).
186. See generally Sweet, supra note 15 (calling for a Civil Gideon movement).
187. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011) (“Neither do we address what due process requires in an unusually complex case.”).
188. See id. (“In particular, that Clause does not require the provision of
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different results, quarantining the Turner ruling to an increasingly narrow range of situations. This method suffers from the
risk that subsequent suits, no matter how well argued, would
result in outcomes similar to Turner. Yet the Turner majority
seemed to signal its willingness to consider more extreme fac189
tors than those present in Turner, and considering that nothing ventured is nothing gained, a litigation-based strategy
190
should be considered by pro-Civil Gideon attorneys.
Finally, a long-term method of expanding the right to
counsel would attempt to overrule the Court’s decision in
Turner outright. The Court is understandably reticent to overturn its precedent, but on the occasions when the Court reconsiders a previous ruling it usually cites several motivating factors: a growing movement among state legislatures and courts
to adopt policies or state-specific doctrines that conflict with the
Court’s rule; the slow erosion of the previous rule’s force and
scope through Supreme Court decisions that distinguish and
limit the rule; and broad consensus among scholars that the
191
rule in question was wrongly decided. Using the above two
tactics in addition to establishing a broad consensus among academics and practitioners that Turner was incorrectly decided
is perhaps the best long-term strategy to expanding the constitutional right to counsel for people facing incarceration in a civil contempt hearing. While each individual tactic can produce a
tangible benefit in the short term, in tandem these efforts also
provide a compelling argument to the Court that its precedent
192
is ripe to be overturned. This may be a difficult path with uncertain ends, but the goal makes it worthwhile. A constitutional
right to counsel would be more durable and broader in reach
than either of the first two options alone.
As part of this long-term strategy to overturn Turner,
commentators and litigators should increasingly put pressure
on the Court’s use of the Eldridge framework and advocate for
counsel where the opposing party . . . is not represented by counsel.”).
189. See id. (noting that the Turner case is not unusually complex or extreme).
190. See, e.g., NAT’L COALITION FOR CIV. RIGHT TO COUNS., supra note 185.
191. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (“The chorus that has
called for us to revisit Belton includes courts, scholars, and Members of this
Court . . . .”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573–74 (2003) (citing changes
in state laws on homosexual conduct and subsequent Supreme Court cases as
reasons for overturning a seventeen-year-old precedent).
192. See Gant, 556 U.S. at 338 (showing how efforts from multiple areas
can influence the Court).
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an approach to procedural due process cases that would more
effectively restrain the Court. Commentators should push for a
unification of substantive and procedural due process jurisprudence. The Eldridge factors are a well-established doctrine, but
the Court has changed its procedural due process cases in the
193
past, and two justices are currently on record as disagreeing
194
with it. If the nation continues to move beyond the procedural
floor set by Turner and expand the right to counsel in civil contempt hearings and if criticism of the Court’s current procedural due process approach is unified and determined, the Court
may determine that the assumptions underlying Eldridge have
been eroded enough to justify a novel approach to an old problem.
CONCLUSION
The Turner Court’s disappointing decision was nonetheless
a reasonable one given the Court’s current approach to procedural due process cases. The Eldridge framework gives the
Court wide latitude to pursue a predetermined outcome and
hence provides ample cover for attempts to critique and overturn the Court’s decision. Because the right to an attorney deserves to be extended to those at risk of incarceration through
civil contempt proceedings and because the Court’s current approach to such cases is inconsistent with the original purpose of
the Due Process Clause, advocates, scholars, and other jurists
should coordinate their steps to affect change. While the first
step to change is the expansion of the right to counsel through
legislation and state and federal test cases, in the long term
these efforts could result in a major overhaul in the Court’s approach to due process cases as well.

193. See supra notes 25–30 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text.

